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Abstract
The Relation of Education and R&D to Productivity
Growth in the Developing Countries of Africa
This paper focuses on the returns to investment in human capital
in the form of investment in primary and secondary education, and in
technology transfer via higher education, in 30 of the poorest coun-
tries of Africa. It specifies a production function and controls over
the 1970-1985 period for investment in physical capital, drought, oil
price shocks, different labor utilization rates, Anglophone and
Francophone differences, and differences in initial productivity
levels.
The results find high 21.2% rates of return to investment in
primary and secondary education, including 18 countries for which
individual rate of return studies do not exist. Employed population
growth alone lowers the growth of per capita output (by 35%). High
20.3% rates of return to investment in higher education are inter-
preted as capturing many of the benefits of technology transfer.

THE RELATION OF EDUCATION AND R&D TO PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF AFRICA
Walter W. McMahon
This paper focuses on the overall efficiency of investment in
primary and secondary education, together with technology transfer via
higher education, in 30 of the poorest countries in Africa. These
countries have most of the problems that are common to all in the
region. Data for all of the countries for which consistent data is
available allows the process of per capita growth to be studied for
recent years while controlling for physical capital investment and
other influences on growth in a way that is not possible in studies
confined to a single country. The way in which a particular fast-
growing or a slow-growing country differs or is the same as others in
the group will then be sorted out for separate analysis by use of a
dummy variable technique.
Although education has long been recognized as a central element
in economic development in Africa (e.g., Harbison and Meyers, 1964),
it is only more recently that the economic criteria and the types of
measurements needed as guides to achieving greater efficiency in human
resource development for faster growth have begun to emerge (e.g.,
Psacharopoulos (1985), and McMahon (1986a, pp. 290-316)). The refine-
ment and use of these techniques is particularly important to the very
poorest countries. Human resources are often their most plentiful
resource, but also they often are not developed very efficiently,
while at the same time physical capital is scarce and relatively
expensive.
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But even though appropriate criteria for efficiency are coming
into wider use, the necessary sample survey data covering costs, earn-
ings and output do not always exist. This is true for many of these
30 sub-Saharan African countries.
To circumvent this problem, this paper employs data on investment
in human an physical capital and on real per capita income growth that
do exist within the context of a vintage human capital model. Invest-
ment also picks up some differences in quality of education that addi-
tional years of schooling do not, as has been developed recently by
Heyneman and White (1986). The model is estimated by simultaneous
equation methods extending earlier work by Wheeler (1980) to develop
rates of return to investment flows in a way that recognizes the two
way flow of causation as investment raises per capita growth, while
this income growth in turn contributes to further investment in edu-
cation.
I. Background of the Countries Studied and Their Economic Problems
The 14 Anglophone and 16 Francophone countries studied for which
data exists on the key variables in the analysis from 1965 through
1985 are outlined more heavily on the map in Figure 1. These coun-
tries have the typical problems with which most are familiar. They
include poverty, with the per capita income in ten of these countries
at less than $200 per year. Low .growth of real GDP per worker aver-
ages 68% for the 25 years from 1960 through 1985 taken as a whole
compared to 170% for Asian countries over the same period as may be
seen in Table 1. These African countries are also plagued by very
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The Thirty African Countries in the Study of
Sources of Productivity Growth
p=| 14 Anglophone 16 Francophone
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Table 1
Growth Rates of Real Gross Domestic Product Per Worker
for the 30 African Countries in this Study, 1960 through 1985
Percent
Growth
Country (Anglophone) 1960-85
Botswana
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Mauritius
Nigeria
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbawe
Average
287.5
47.5
5.0
90.0
25.0
97.5
47.5
92.5
20.0
17.5
170.0
80.0
10.0
25.0
72.5%
Percent
Growth
Country (Francophone) 1960-85
Average, 30 Countries in Africa
Average, Asian Countries
Algeria 90.0
Benin 30.0
Berundi 75.0
Congo 145.0
Central African Rep. 5.0
Ivory Coast 112.5
Madagascar 10.0
Mali 30.0
Mautania 95.0
Morocco 67.5
Rwanda 72.5
Senegul 30.0
Togo 97.5
Tunisia 142.5
Upper Volta 37.5
Zaire -10.0
Average 64.3%
68.17%
70.0%
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high rates of population growth, and great inequality in the distri-
bution of income (see World Bank, 1985, Annex Tables 19 and 27).
Artificially depressed agricultural prices and overvalued currencies
in foreign exchange markets impede productivity growth in agriculture.
These problems are accompanied by a poor showing on most of the
sources of medium term productivity growth that will be included in
our analysis. These include high rates of unemployment and underem-
ployment, low rates of investment in physical capital (and the related
low median private saving rates, e.g., 10% compared to 20% in many
industrialized countries), and low human capital investment. These
lead to very low literacy rates and low life expectancy at birth.
Finally almost all of these countries suffered from the adverse
effects of oil shocks in the 70' s and 80 ' s and from drought.
The most striking single fact is the marked tendency of the
poorest countries in Africa to grow more slowly than the others.
According to a recent World Bank (1986) study, the 29 lowest income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are eligible for help from the
World Bank's International Development Association together now have a
lower income and output per head than they did in 1960, and per capita
income that is 20% lower than it was in 1970.
There are some bright spots however. Cheaper oil is now helping
most of these countries since most are oil importers. This effect
must be controlled for in the empirical analysis that follows. The
economic recovery now occurring in the industrialized countries also
helps, since northern industrial countries buy 80% of Africa's
exports. Lower interest rates are helping to reduce debt service in
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these debtor countries, while also facilitating private domestic in-
vestment and making foreign loans more accessable. Finally, although
real GDP per person fell in most of these countries over the last 15
years, there is the interesting case of Botswana where it rose at
7 1/4% per year.
With respect to investment in education as a means of achieving
faster growth, Table 2 summarizes the results of the previous rate of
return studies that have been done in 12 of these 30 countries to
date. If anything, studies of rates of return in these countries will
tend to under-estimate the true returns since most of these govern-
ments have intervened to keep farm prices artificially low and since
over 80% of the population is employed in agriculture. Nevertheless,
the social rates of return are fairly high, averaging 27.2% for
investment in primary education and 16.2% for investment in secondary
education, rates which are also high in relation to the rates of
return for most investment in physical capital.
The private rates of return to higher education are high in
relation to the social rates in all of these countries. This is due
to the extraordinary extent to which most of these governments
subsidize room and board as well as tuition, often for young adults
from the most well to do families. This pattern is even more pro-
nounced in the Francophone countries, see Mingat and Psacharopoulos
(1985) and Jimenez (1986). The contribution to production to using
resources in this way is one of the effects that will be tested in the
empirical analysis later.
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Table 2
The Social and Private Rates of Return to Investment in Education
I
Country:
(A = Anglophone
B = Francophone) Year Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher
Botswana (A) 1983 42.0 41.0 15.0 99.0 76.0 38.0
Ethopia (A) 1972 20.3 18.7 9.7 35.0 22.8 27.4
Ghana (A) 1967 18.0 13.0 16.5 24.5 17.0 37.0
Kenya (A) 1971 21.7 19.2 8.8 28.0 33.0 31.0
Liberia (A) 1983 41.0 17.0 8.0 99.0 30.5 17.0
Malawi (A) 1982 14.7 15.2 11.5 15.7 16.8 46.6
Morocco (F) 1970 50.5 10.0 13.0
Nigeria (A) 1966 23.0 12.8 17.0 30.0 14.0 34.0
Somalia (A) 1983 20.6 10.4 19.9 59.9 13.0 33.2
Sudan (A) 1974 8.0 4.0 13.0 15.0
Tanzania (A) 1982 5.0
Upper Volta (F) 1982 20.1 14.9 22.3
Average, These Countries 27.2 15.4 13.2 48.9 26.2 31.0
Source: The results of many studies as summarized by Psacharopoulos (1985),
II. The Model
Economic theory suggests a joint determination of growth of poten-
tial output from the supply side and growth of effective demand to-
gether determining growth of real output per capita. In either a
neo-classical or a neo-classical-Keysesian synthesis model
,
physical
capital, human capital, raw labor, and knowledge capital deepening can
be introduced, while allowing for variable proportions, and these then
together contribute to growing output from the supply side. This
paper will concentrate on these "total" capital deepening effects.
But there is also the growth of effective demand , especially invest-
ment demand, that contributes to higher employment rates that are also
necessary to the growth of actual GDP. Demand growth and externally
imposed shocks therefore must be controlled for, hopefully in ways
more sophisticated than mere statistical smoothing in order to measure
the net effects from total capital deepening.
Total Capital Deepening
Physical, human, and knowledge capital deepening effects are
derived from the production function in equation (1) below. But
first, this capital deepening typical of a growing economy is viewed
as a process typical of the medium term. Focusing on the medium term
recognizes that shorter term dynamic models are concerned primarily
with 6 to 18 month demand-induced fluctuations. They deal with
periods that are two short for the effects from capital deepening on
the supply side to be readily apparent. Similarly, long run steady
state growth solutions normally apply when capital deepening is no
-9-
longer continuing to occur, a situation these African economies have
not yet achieved. The medium term is shorter than this very long run,
and also short enough to be relevant to most economic policy, includ-
ing the human, physical, and knowledge capital investment policies
typical of most five year plans.
The capital deepening process is conceived of in Equation (1) as
embodying scientific, social scientific, and technical knowledge in
human capital H, and similar technologies in physical capital, K.
Symbolically H = AH and K = A„K where the A„ and A„ represent new
technical and managerial knowledge embodied and the overbar symbolizes
capital in efficiency units. Human capital is formed and the new
knowledge embodied through the process of investment in the education
of each new generation (I ). Physical capital is formed with the new
technology embodied in the newest vintages of physical capital again
through the process of investment (I,.).
This emodiment of the new technology is assumed to take place
through gross investment (I and I K ) , that is, not only through net
new but also through replacement investment. Replacement is a major
part of human capital investment as people retire, and the most recent
generation is taught the most recent skills. Similarly, replacement
investment in physical capital is also an important means of embodying
the new technology as machines and structures deteriorate. Capital
embodying the new knowledge can also be imported from abroad. In the
case of human capital , investment in higher education of graduate
students studying abroad can become an important means of embodiment
that transfers technology and innovative skills as these graduate
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students return home from the industrialized countries and, if they
have the training and capacities to adapt their skills to local
conditions, are productively employed. Gross Investment in higher
education (I ) will therefore include investment by donors in the
RE
education of graduate students abroad.
The stock of knowledge capital, A, is disembodied technology that
is also increased by acts of investment, in this case, in research and
development. For these African countries, much of the basic invest-
ment in R&D however is done in the industrialized countries. This
fact, plus the lack of consistent data on investment in R&D in African
countries, and considerable exploration revealing the weakness of the
direct immediate impacts of R&D on productivity growth in the indus-
trialized nations, see McMahon (1954), all commend the assumption that
most new science and technology is "embodied" first before transfer.
Investment in R&D in the African countries that adapts research done
elsewhere to local soil, climate, crop, and labor availability condi-
tions is very important. But it will be assumed here that this
residual domestic R&D, which may be relatively small, also is brought
to bear on production only after investment that embodies it in
physical or human capital
,
making human and physical capital invest-
ment more effective. Investment in R&D thereby increases the contri-
bution of other forms of investment to productivity growth.
The production function accommodating these capital deepening ef-
fects is:
-li-
en Y = Y(U, (|) Q t, N, K, H, HE, E)
where Y = Real output,
U = Utilization rate, measured as employment divided by
the total population,
Y(— ) = Initial level of output per person employed,
N = Employment
,
K = Physical capital^ with science and technical change
embodied, e.g., K = A^K, where K and other terms with
overbars are conceived of as measured in efficiency
units.
H = Human _capital found_by primary and secondary education,
e.g. , H = A^H with H in efficiency units that embody the
skills or attitudes that facilitate the dissemination of
technology,
HE = Human capital formed by higher education, with science,
social science, and other knowledge embodied in part by
graduate study abroad, e.g., HE = A^gHE, and
E = Energy and drought shocks.
Before differentiating this with respect to time to focus on rates of
growth, a brief explanation of two of the influences in addition to
total capital deepening that are included above and that must be
controlled for in the empirical analysis is needed.
A higher labor utilization rate , U, reflects lower unemployment
and part-time underemployment, but is also correlated with less idle
capital capacity in more capital intensive economies. Higher utili-
zation is hypothesized to be associated with larger output,
9Y(Hyp: Tjr > 0), as is the pattern in industrialized countries. Since
aggregate demand levels in each of these countries are not specified
directly in the model, utilization rates serve as a proxy and control
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for influences on output due to changes in demand or insufficiency of
demand.
Y
Higher initial productivity levels , («j) j after other effects are
taken into account, are expected to be related to slower additional
3 Y
growth, (Hyp: —y— < 0). This term controls for the difference in
8
<!>o
the intercepts of the equation explaining productivity growth as it
is applied to data for the different African countries in the sample.
This hypothesis is not inconsistent with the fact that the poorest
countries are growing more slowly since there is less capital deepen-
ing in these countries to embody the technology and bring it to bear
on production. This Rosenberg (1976) effect from higher failure rates
for new innovations that is a cost borne by the leader should show up
as a negative effect on growth but only when there are controls for
the other influences.
Growth and Productivity Growth
Totally differentiating the production function given by Eq. (1)
with respect to time gives:
. . 3Y_
_
3Y 9U 3Y .Y. 9Y 3N _3_Y 3jC £Y 3H, 3Y_ 3HE
(
' 3t 3U 3t
a
,Y. V 3N 3t 3- 3t 3- 3t 3— 3t
3(jj) K H HE
3Y 3E
3E 3t
Dividing through by real output, Y, converts the growth rate on the left
to a percentage rate of change over time. It also leads to investment
3 ~K 1 K
expenditure terms on the right such as (v~) (^) = tt- that are independent
d t Y Y
of national currencies.
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3Y J_ ._ 3Y 3U 1 3Y ,Y. 1 3Y 3N N 1 3Y 3K 1(3) 3t Y 3D 3t Y
a
.Y« Vo Y 3N 3t N Y 3— 3t Y
3Y 3H 1 3Y_ 3HE 1 3Y 3E 1
— 3t Y 3—- 3t Y 3E 3t Y
o H HE
This can be simplified by using lower case letters to represent percen-
f u i 3Y 1 3N Ktage rates of change over time (e.g., y = =— — , n = =— —) , as well
d t Y o t N '
3 Y
as by using parameters to represent coefficients (e.g., a = -577).
J oil
Then notice that under the assumptions discussed below, the partial
derivatives of output with respect to the inputs are the marginal
3Y
physical products of each input (e.g., — = MPP77) , and that the par-
3K
K
tial derivatives of each capital input with respect to time is merely
investment. With these simplifications, Eq. (3) becomes:
MPPN- N lK ZH XHF
(4) y = (
Y
*
) n + MPP^
-| + MPF^ — + MPP—
-f-
Y/N
u
u
3E/3t
'2 Y 3 Y 4 y
This says that after controlling for changes in utilization rates, u,
initial productivity levels (Y/N) , and energy and drought shocks,
3E/3t, the growth of real output, y, is explainable in terms of the
contribution made by the growth in employment of unimproved labor
weighted by its marginal product, plus the rate of investment in
physical, human, and knowledge capital weighted by their respective
marginal products.
Labor productivity growth, as distinguished from total factor
productivity growth can be obtained at least to a very close approxi-
mation by merely subtracting n from both sides of equation (4), so
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Chat growth in output per person employed (y-n) appears on the left
as in equation (5) below. It would be possible to conceive of this
as growth in output per hour if one wished to measure N as the
number of hours employed rather than the number of persons employed.
On the right in equation (5) below, a , the coefficient of the
employment growth term is raw labor's share of national output if
there is some degree of competition, less one. a therefore can be
expected to be negative. If raw labor's distributive share is 60%
for example, after subtracting n from both sides to explain produc-
tivity growth, the labor growth term that remains on the right is
MPP„7 N
an = ( - l)n = (.6-l)n = -.4n. This illustrates that growth in
Y
unimproved raw labor due in part to population growth, without other
forms of capital deepening, reasonably can be expected to be asso-
ciated with falling, and not with rising, output per capita, and ex-
plains why 3(y-n)/3n is hypothesized to be negative.
Rates of Return, Simultaneity, and the Model to be Estimated
In the two final steps to derive the model to be estimated con-
taining the hypotheses to be tested, if it is assumed that raw labor,
physical, human, and knowledge capital are all paid amounts that are
approximately equal to their respective marginal products, then in an
investment-theoretic framework, their marginal products are also their
respective rates of return. Using the symbol r* for each rate of
return, equation (5) below therefore follows from equation (4) above.
This is the first equation that is part of the jointly dependent
system that will be estimated by simultaneous equation methods.
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Second, the growth in per capita output generates income that
feeds back into higher purchasing power and hence higher investment
demand for physical, human, and knowledge capital as specified in
equations (6)-(8) as shown:
*
T
K * V * X HE (Y/N)(5) (y-n) = a
±
n + ^ - + r^ - + r^— + ^ ——
+ a 3Y +a 4D 3 +a 4D 5 +a 4°6 + a
(6) I-^/Y = B 1 (y-n) + 8 2D 3 + 6^ + 6 4D + 6 Q
(7) I-/Y = Yl (y-n) + y^ + Y^ + y^ + Y Q
(8) I-j^/Y = ^(y-n) + 6
2
D
3
+ 6
3
D
4
+ 5^ + 6
With the addition of the relevant shocks as measured by dummy var-
iables, the system is identified. The remaining explanatory var-
iables are:
r = rate of interest in each country in each period,
D_ = 1 = Anglophone; 2 = Francophone country,
D = drought shock to agricultural output, 1965-79 = 0;
k 1980-85 = 1,
D = energy shock, 1965-74 = 0; 1975-85 = 1,
D, = geographical energy shock, where = oil importing country;
1 = oil exporter.
III. Empirical Tests: The Data and the Results
In this section the data will first be described briefly. Then
the model jointly determining medium term productivity growth and
levels of investment in physical and human capital that is shown in
equations (5)-(8) above is estimated by two stage least squares
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simultaneous equation methods with the results as shown in Table 3
below. The effects of using a more reasonable lag structure results
in a recursive model that then can be estimated by ordinary least
squares single equation methods with results for both the produc-
tivity growth equation and for growth not expressed in per capita
terms then is shown in Table 4.
The Data
The data on growth and on productivity growth all refer to total
increments for the five year time periods of 1965-70, 1970-75,
1975-80, and 1980-85 for each of the 27 Sub-Saharan African Countries
plus the northern countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The
twenty year period should be long enough to clearly reveal the net
effects of capital deepening on productivity growth.
The five year growth increments of real Gross Domestic Product,
employment, and population, (the latter used to compute labor utiliza-
tion rates), are from the National Income and Product Accounts
published in the UNESCO (1983) Statistical Yearbook , updated with data
supplied directly on request from the World Bank. The deflators are
from the World Tables, published by the World Bank (1983) and updated
by data from the Bank. Real investment and real GDP as shown on the
right in equations (5) and on the left in equations (6)-(8) are from
the same UNESCO and World Bank sources. These are measured in local
currencies converted to constant prices since investment appears as a
ratio to GDP eliminating the need for using exchange rates.
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Investment data is available for 1970, 1975, and 1980 only, and is
measured as gross investment, rather than as net investment (which
would also require the nebulous procedure of estimating depreciation).
This is based on the rationale offered above for including replacement
investment in both physical and human capital as a major means by
j
which the relevant technology and managerial knowledge is embodied.
Investment in education includes investment by government but also
that investment done by families in the form of foregone earnings.
Foregone earnings are estimated for primary school children at zero.
For secondary school children age 13 to 18, as well as for young
adults in college, foregone earnings are calculated as the number of
persons in school, or in college, obtained from the UNESCO Statistical
Yearbook (various years) multiplied by the average annual wage or
salary in manufacturing obtained from the Yearbook of Labor
Statistics
,
International Labor Organization, (1983).
Investment in higher education includes not only the investment
made by families and governments at indigenous institutions, but it
also includes the investment made by donors such as the governments of
the industrialized countries and the World Bank in the education of
African students abroad. Data on support of these students is from
the United Nations ( Student Assistance , 1985). Finally, data on
interest rates are from the International Financial Statistics
published by the International Monetary Fund (1985) and from the World
Development Report
,
World Bank (1985).
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Empirical Results
The simultaneous equation estimates in Table 3 show that all of
the explanatory variables discussed above in both the productivity
growth equation and the three investment equations have an effect in
the direction expected. Their signs are all consistent with the
hypotheses. The same is true for the signs of the coefficients esti-
mated for the recursive model by single equation least squares methods
shown in Table 4.. The t-statistics are smaller for the simultaneous
equation estimates of the productivity growth equation (9) in Table 3,
but this is to be expected because of the loss in the degrees of
freedom due to the larger number of explanatory variables in the
entire system. The t-statistics in Table 4 for 80 degrees of freedom
indicate that all of the total capital deepening sources of produc-
tivity growth are significant. Investment in physical capital reaches
the .001 level of significance, investment in primary education the
10% level, and investment in higher education including education of
graduate students abroad the 20% level, all after controlling for the
other effects in which we are less directly interested. Increased
labor input contributes to aggregate growth with a coefficient of
.48 in equation (14). But although raw labor's share of growing ag-
gregate income is 52-65% (from Eqs. (14) and (13)), growing employment
of unimproved labor alone does not contribute to per capita growth,
(see Eq. (13)). Instead taken alone it reduces per capita growth by
335%, also as hypothesized.
Rates of Return and Efficiency for Faster Growth
The logic of the recursive model in Table 4 is superior to that
of the simultaneous equation model because it allows 1-5 years for
-21-
investment in physical and human capital to affect productivity
growth. Lagged effects in equations (13) and (14) also serve to pick
up effects from total investment in prior periods. The coefficients
therefore are very conservative in that they tend to underestimate
,
if anything, the true rates of return to each form of investment.
The growth increments on the left are five year increments, so
the coefficients on the right must be converted to a rate that com-
pounds over five years to appear as an annual rate of return. These
rates are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Social Rates of Return to Investment
in Physical and Human Capital
1970-1985
Returns to
Investment in:
Annual Social Rates of Return
Country Study
Recursive Model Average
(from Table 4) (from Table 1)
Physical Capital
Human Capital (Average for
Primary and Secondary)
Human Capital (Higher Education)
10.5%
21.2%
20.3%
21.7%
13.9%
To compute the annual rate of return for Table 5 from the five
year interval in equation (13):
(18) (1+r*) 11 = r
R
= 1.65, from Eq. (13). So:
(19) ln(l+r*) C = (In 1.65)/5
(20) r* = INV[(ln 1.65 )/5] - 1 = 10.5%, shown in Table 5.
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Since the coefficients in equations (13) and (14) are very similar,
the rates of return computed from them will be similar and need not be
shown separately.
These rates of return to investment in primary and secondary edu-
cation for 1970-85 of 21.2% compare very closely to the 21.7% rate
that is the average of those obtained from the individual country
studies that is shown in the second column. Since the new rates in
Table 5 are based on totally different data, they constitute indepen-
dent confirmation of substantial returns to investment in primary and
secondary education in the last 15 years, returns of over 21% per
annum in growth of real output per capita for the funds invested.
With respect to higher education, we have stressed the embodiment
and transfer of technology from the industrialized countries. The
externalities of this technology transfer do raise GDP and therefore
are reflected in the 20.3% rate of return in Table 5 but are not
necessarily reflected in the private money earnings of students
returning from abroad. This effect from dissemination of science and
technology could easily explain why the 20.3% is above the 13.9% rates
of return obtained by studies that are based on salary data alone.
This may be especially true in these African countries since so many
educated Africans enter teaching, and some enter government service.
Finally, investment in R&D and disembodied technical change has
not been treated separately. Consistent data to test the effects of
investment in R&D directly do not exist. But there is justification
for treating most effective technical change as embodied through in-
vestment in human and physical capital. It appears in a study of the
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sources of productivity growth in the 15 industrialized OECD nations
for which consistent data on public and private business enterprise
investment do exist. There McMahon (1984) found that investment in
R&D (creating disembodied technology) consistently revealed a coef-
ficient that both was small and also was insignificant or at best of
marginal significance. The conclusion on this point was that the lags
are too long before the disembodied technology produced by R&D affects
productivity growth significantly. They are so long that data for the
15-20 years for which consistent data exists is not long enough to
accommodate the lag structure while also controlling for other sources
of productivity growth. Much of the measured effect of technical
change and technology transfer therefore is picked up as it is trans-
mitted via embodiment in physical and human capital. This is an
effect that was first noted by Solow in relation to investment in
physical capital. Here it increases the impact on growth of both
physical and human capital formation.
Individual Country Difference
The main results of this analysis in Table 4 reveal a number of
other effects on per capita growth after controlling for other things.
They also reveal effects on the rates of investment that also are
relevant to the growth process. Some of these effects apply to all
of the 30 African countries, some to subsets of the group, and others
apply differently to individual countries as will be developed below.
The variable distinguishing between Anglophone and Francophone
countries reveals that productivity growth is a bit higher in the
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Anglophone countries. But this difference is not significant when
controlling for all of the other effects (see D76 in equations (13)
and (14)). However this same variable reveals that there is a some-
what larger "effort" for primary and secondary education in the
Anglophone countries (equation (16)), but very significantly smaller
relative to investment in higher education there as compared to the
Francophone countries (equation (17)). This is probably the result
of the relatively high degree of public subsidies for higher education
(and relatively low parental contribution), in the Francophone coun-
tries, even though most of the college students are from the highest
income families. The waste implicit in this practice is developed in
detail by Mingat and Psacharopoulos (1985) as well as by Jimenez
(1986).
A second differential effect may be seen in the higher growth in
the oil exporting countries in this period (see D6 in equations (13)
and (14)). Although this effect is not very significant, the higher
rate of investment in the oil exporting countries in physical capital
and in higher education is quite significant. (See D6 in equations
(15) and (17).) The oil exporting countries have benefitted in invest-
ment and in growth at the expense of the oil importing countries in
the 70 's and 80 *s.
For these African countries taken as a group, it is clear that the
restriction of oil production resulting in higher oil prices and less
cheap energy had a significantly adverse effect on per capita growth
(D5 in equations (13) and (14)). The oil shock also depressed invest-
ment in physical capital, as well as investment in higher education
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(D5 in equations (15) and (17)). The higher interest rates that were
brought on by the oil price increases and high inflation rates after
1973 further constrained investment in physical capital by significant
amounts (see r in equation (15)). The lower utilization rates that
followed also contributed to slower growth (u/Y in equations (13) and
(14)), although this lower utilization rate effect was less signifi-
cant. Now utilization is rising, oil prices are lower, and interest
rates are falling, all of which should help to restore per capita
growth rates to the pre-oil-shock levels. But the onset of drought is
continuing to slow growth (see variable D4 in equations (13) and
(14)), with coefficients that are larger in absolute terms than those
of all of the other dummy variables combined.
The sources of individual differences in growth rates among
countries are further revealed in the analyses reported in Tables 6
and 7. In Table 6, "slope" and "intercept" dummies are introduced
for Zaire, the slowest growing country in the group, and Botswana,
the fastest growing country. The main result shown in Table 6 is that
with respect to the returns per "dollar" invested, whether in Zaire
or in Botswana, there is no significant difference in the returns to
comparable investment from the returns in the other 29 African
nations. This lack of significant difference in the slope coef-
ficients especially is shown by the very small t-statistics for all of
the country-specific dummy variables in columns 4-6 of Table 6. The
intercept term also is not significantly different for Zaire, one of
the poorest and slowest growing countries. But the intercept is
significantly higher for Botswana.
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Examining these two more extreme cases further, Zaire has actually
had negative per capita growth during the last 25 years. Typical of
all lower income areas (e.g. , Mississippi and Alabama within the
U.S.), it is making a larger "effort" in the form of investment in
primary and secondary education as a percent of its income than some
of the higher income countries (see Table 7). But Zaire is not making
a larger "effort" for basic education than Botswana (Table 7), which
now has almost achieved universal primary education, close to the
first nation to have done so in Africa. The adult literacy rates
furthermore remain very low in Zaire, illustrating that even the
larger "effort" is still small in relation to the scope of the prob-
lem. If anything, the rates of return to primary and secondary
education in Zaire are higher than the African average as shown by the
larger (but insignificantly so) primary and secondary slope coeffi-
cients (see Table 6, col. (5)). But in spite of high rates of return,
there are considerable inefficiencies and some wasteful corruption in
Zaire. When the government took over the primary and secondary
schools from the missionaries, it initially was a disaster. Zaire's
effort for higher education furthermore (Table 7) involves consider-
able waste since the universities are all free, and there are tremen-
dous queues for admission, with no community college alternatives for
those who are turned down.
Both physical capital investment and higher education appear to
return somewhat less in Zaire than in other countries in Africa,
although again the difference is not very significant (Table 6, cols.
(4) and (6)). But the 31% rate of investment as a percent of GDP is
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Table 7
Fast Growth and Falling Per Capita Output Patterns
Countries Rank
Ordered by
Growth Rates:
Fastest in Asia
Annual
Growth of
Real GDP
Per Capita
1960-1981
Percent Enrolled '
1980
Primary Secondary Higher
Investment Rates
1980
,
in Percent
IH/Y IHE/Y IK/Y
Sources and Notes :
1. Enrollment data, and 1960-81 growth rates from the World Bank (1985).
2. African data is the same as that used in the regressions with sources cited in
the text.
3. Indonesian data from McMahon (1986), p. 85 (HI) allocated between higher and
common schools based on data on p. 70.
4. Foregone earnings not included in these two cases only.
Korea 6.9 107 85 14 3.5 3.4 32
Japan 6.3 101 91 30 3.9 .44 32
Indonesia3 4.1 98 28 5 3.9 .74
2Fastest in Africa 1960-1985
Botswana 5.6 86.9 40.3 6.0 5.5 1.2 44
Swaziland 4.0 79.8 66.1 15.8 3.5 1.2 31
Congo 3.6 100.0 97.5 20.0 4.8 2.3 41
2Slowest in Africa 1960-1985
Zambia .4 68.4 56.3 3.8 3.3 1.6 23
Ghana .2 42.5 48.6 8.1 1.8 .1 8
Central African .2 56.8 25.2 2.4 7.2 3.2 7
Republic
Zaire -.4 65.7 48.3 3.7 4.1 2.0 31
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substantial (Table 7). The problem may be that there also is waste
in these forms of investment (col. (4), Table 6). There are consider-
able underdeveloped hydroelectric power and copper resources , almost
no beasts of burden which cannot survive the tetse fly, and hence
insufficient investment in small tractors. The latter, together with
the restraints placed on agricultural prices have impeded the growth
of productivity in agriculture. Combined with the significant adverse
effects on per capita growth of oil shocks (Table 6, col. (8)),
drought (Table 6, col. (9)), and population growth (Table 4, eq.
(13)), the positive effects of total capital deepening have been
insufficient (Table 6, cols. (1), (2), and (3)). The result has been
negative per capita growth.
Botswana on the other hand has had one of the highest, if not the
highest, per capita growth of any nation in Africa. It is not typical,
with most of its small population strung out along the rail line, a
very large 5.5% rate of investment in primary and secondary education
(Table 7), and the near-universal primary education mentioned earlier.
It also has one of the highest rates of investment in physical capital
(see the 44% in Table 7), part of which has been due to the encourage-
ment to foreign investors to come in and develop its natural resources.
Swaziland and the Congo, two more of the faster growing countries,
also display (in Table 5) very high rates of investment in primary
and secondary education with high percentages enrolled , accompanied by
high 31-41% rates of investment in physical capital.
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IV. Conclusion
New estimates of rates of return to investment in primary and
secondary education of 21.2% based on different kinds of data provide
independent confirmation of both the high growth pay-off from this
type of investment and of the 21.7% average rates obtained in indi-
vidual country studies. Differences in rates of return to education
for individual countries (if any) demonstrate a dummy variable tech-
nique capable of estimating rates of return for the 18 African coun-
tries for which as of this date individual country-specific rate of
return studies do not exist.
Returns to investment in higher education are also found to be
high, and at 20.3%, also above the rates of return to investment in
physical capital. This suggests continuing serious underinvestment
in education, including higher education in Africa, perhaps partly
because of the inefficiency and inequity implicit in the failure to
recover more resources from the families of higher income students in
many of these countries, resources that could be used to expand access
through two year non-residential colleges, higher primary and secondary
retention rates, improved quality, and other means.
Science and technology as well as technology transfer for develop-
ment is treated here within the context of a vintage human and physical
capital model. Embodiment of the new knowledge and technology through
investment that brings it to bear on production can help to explain
the larger contribution of investment in higher education and in other
forms of physical and human capital to per capita growth.
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Footnotes
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1„ . , T , t ) can be regarded as a reason-Gross investment (T^, 1—, and li-
able and close first approximation of a change in a capital stock that
exists when the capital stock is measured in current efficiency units
(K, H, and HE). This can be shown by differentiating the capital
stocks with respect to time:
3K/3t = e I- - 5
R
K
(<t>
2
/e
2
)t
3H/3t = e I—- 5 UH, etc., (see Gapinski, 1982, p. 291).
Here $ is the rate at which the new technology is embodied via gross
investment (I— and I—), and e is the elasticity of output with respect
K H
to physical or human capital inputs.
The current period t serves as a base, since K, H, and HE are in
current efficiency units. Therefore the unit weight, e = 1,
. . . ,,„,.„
(*/e)(v-t) (<fr/e)(t-t) .
applies to period t such that: e = e = e = 1.
For the current period's investment:
(4^/e )t
3K/3t = e I— - 6 K = e I— - (constant)
K. K K
9K/9t = I— less a constant.
K
2
See footnote 1.
3
When the lag is eliminated, in results not shown here, the coeffi-
cient of the labor growth term in the productivity growth equation is
MPP *N
N
exactly = (— - 1) when labor's share is estimated as shown in
equation (4), exactly as hypothesized. That is, the first coefficient
in equations (13) and (14) add exactly to unity when the lag is elim-
inated.
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